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Abstract 
 
 
New Public Management reform puts an all-new perspective on public managers and 
politician’s accountability towards citizens. It tends to shift public administration to an 
open system making citizens an important stakeholder. Public participation has been 
reported as frequently used in service delivery and management (mostly budgetary) 
decisions. Public administration scholars and practitioners analysed, in the last decade, 
the different ways of citizens participation, their motivation, impact on public 
management and public officer opinion concerning citizen’s co-management (Yang & 
Callaham, 2007; Handely, Milam, & Howell-Moroney, 2010; Wang, 2001). 
 
This paper proposes to test the relation between the mechanisms to voice citizens, 
political responsiveness, citizen’s political culture and contextual factors. Firstly, we 
argue that citizens’ participation is greater and meaningful according to the level of 
ethical responsibility displayed by politicians.  The second explanation is based on the 
degree of citizen political culture and agues that in jurisdictions where citizens are more 
aware of and more motivated to follow public policies, there will be a higher level of 
public participation. Finally, we argue that there are contextual factors that also play an 
important role in this accountability process. 
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Accountability Towards Citizens: Stakeholder perception from Portuguese Local 
Government  
The responsiveness of politicians, in the use of their public powers, has been a 
topic of interest by academics from the beginning of the study of administrative science. 
Woodrow Wilson (1887, p. 213) argued that there is no danger in power, if only it be not 
irresponsible. Although this early call, accountability, responsiveness and civic 
participation only became a major issue, within the reform agenda, since the last two 
decades. The fragmentation that occurred in public organizations, the managerial agenda 
and the latest tendencies of new public service established the citizen as an important 
stakeholder in the decision making process. 
We found a lot of academic work dealing with accountability (Barberis, 1998; 
Deleon, 1998), civic participation (Carr, 2010; Evans, 2004; Handely, Milam, & Howell-
Moroney, 2010; Moynihan, 2003; Oliver, 2000; Tavares & Carr, 2010) and managerial 
responsiveness (Bryer, 2006; Chi, 1999; Wang, 2001; Yang & Callaham, 2007). 
Although all this prior work, this paper tries to fill a lacuna since it tries to analyze, as a 
whole, what has been treated separately to explain the willingness of elected officials to 
voice citizens. Academics have focused on civic participation and on their motivation to 
have an active citizenship, but we argue that no matter how much one is willing to have 
an active participation he can only do so if politicians opt to promote the proper tools of 
participation. Adapting Mosher (1968) argument, we believe that responsibility comes in 
two ways: an objective way based on the political actions and a subjective way linked to 
psychological aspects and politicians’ values. That is, accountability can be measured by 
looking at the efforts that public officials make to have transparency in their 
management, by the mechanisms that held them accountable to stakeholders and by their 
moral understanding and ethical standards. Accountability, through the promotion of 
citizen participation, comes in both ways: one depending on the moral responsiveness of 
politicians; and the other, directly related with the external environment that will pressure 
politicians to promote mechanisms of civic participation.  
So, in this paper, we argue that the political decisions which open ways of 
communication and civic participation are based on an individual political motivation, as 
well as on outsider pressures. We use political responsiveness, citizens’ political culture 
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and contextual factors as a three-way explanation to the institutional changes that allowes 
citizens to play an active role in decision-making process. 
We gathered data, for this paper, from a survey conducted among local 
governments in Portugal. We chose the local level of government since it is the level 
where civic participation is maximized as well as the political motivation to do so. The 
number of mechanisms that allows citizen participation is our dependent variable. As 
independent variables, we use political responsiveness, citizen political culture and 
contextual factors. Responsiveness to participation values was obtained from a ranking 
based on respondents’ perception on public participation. Citizen political culture was 
measured using a set of three indicators: electoral participation, education level and civic 
participation. Local government size and the concentration of mass media were used to 
measure contextual factors. 
This paper is divided in seven sections. In the first we present the bases of 
accountability and the changes that occurred in public stakeholders’ perception. Second 
we present our explanation of incumbents’ decision to voice citizens. Thirdly, we define 
the different kind and tools of civic participation analyzed in this investigation. Fourth, 
we systematically state the hypotheses that test our theoretical explanation. The indicators 
for each hypothesis are presented in the fifth part. Six, we explain our empirical models 
and results. Finally, we discuss the main conclusion of this investigation. 
 
Accountability and citizen’s participation 
Until few years ago, Public Administration tended to organize itself within its 
own boundaries refuting forms of externalization. Based on centralized procedures and 
formal authority, Public Administration has revealed to be a very closed organization 
only willing to accept citizen’s participation as a mechanism of power legitimacy. In this 
case, politicians were only accountable to the public, via parliament, for their own 
decisions and those of their staff and departments (Barberis, 1998). However status quo 
changed. Reform movements introduced market and networking solutions and led Public 
Administration to adopt major strategies of externalization. The proliferation and 
multiplication of entities with responsibilities in the provision of public service made 
accountability a much complex process. Street-level bureaucrats, private agents, 
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nonprofit organizations and elected officials, all share responsibilities that were not 
suitable to be controlled, only, by the traditional election scheme (Bertelli & Lynn, 2003).  
In a first stage, New Public Management (NPM) reform agenda, driven by a neo-
liberal set of doctrines, was based on the introduction of performance management 
system, fragmentation and competition spirit in public administration. New forms of 
accountability were needed do deal with managerial reforms (Deleon, 1998; 
Maesschalck, 2004). The political and hierarchical control gave place to a contractual 
control and, as a consequence, accountability switched from a political to a more rational 
orientation. The focus centered on how to control the new agencies and balance their 
greater autonomy with the necessity to make them accountable for their actions. At the 
same time, managerial reform introduced the concept of stakeholder in Public 
Management. That is, the idea of responsiveness of public officials towards a group of 
people that are affected by their action. Between all the stakeholders, citizens assume a 
central part in the accountability process. In the beginning acting as customers, evaluating 
the service provided and offering critical information about their satisfaction and the 
quality of the service provided by contracted agents 
On a second stage, accountability incorporated political responsibility beyond the 
traditional electoral process. The main function of the State isn’t only to make 
economically efficient decisions but also to voice citizens and gather civic participation 
to improve quality in decision and acceptance in implementation (Davids, Theron, & 
Maphunye, 2005). Some academics (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Araújo, 2007) argue 
against the reductive understanding of citizens as costumers. They argue that the concept 
of customer is linked to a market relation where both sides are compelled to fulfill the 
terms of a formal contract. The problem is that, being a market type relation, it is 
bounded by the length of the contract. Being a citizen is much more than that. It’s 
belonging to a political community where continuous and permanent relations are 
expected. New Public Service paradigm argues that the search for a better State isn’t only 
achieved with better managerial processes; it’s also promoting democratic processes of 
decision making allowing citizens to play an active role (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). In 
other words, the idea is to build a new concept of citizenship. And, by that, we mean that 
an active citizenship behavior can’t be restricted to a simple electoral participation, it’s 
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more than that. It’s a process where citizen shares responsibilities and takes decisions 
with public officials. So, nowadays, civic participation is understood as a way to bring 
performance and accountability to public management (Moynihan, 2003). 
 
Theories of participation  
 A lot of empirical work has been done by academics in order to determine 
which factors explain citizens’ active participation in their communities. Some works 
focus to find evidence in order to explain citizens’ motivations of voting. Others focus on 
the citizens’ choice to participate in community welfare provision through non-profit 
organizations. In this paper we argue that citizens’ participation is, also, due to political 
decisions from elected officials. We argue that, the citizen depends also on the political 
decision to voice citizens, providing specific mechanism of participation. So, we are 
looking forward to bring together the pressures put, on elected officials, by citizen eager 
to participate and the willingness of political official to be accountable to their 
shareholders. Adapting Handley and Howell-Moroney (2010) the main idea of the paper 
is that communities where political officials feel greater accountability to citizens or feel 
greater pressure to be accountable will have higher levels of citizen participation.  
 Several theories have been used to explain political decisions to provide the 
proper institutional adjustment to allow more civic engagement in government. The 
political responsiveness argument captures the level of mayors’ commitment and 
willingness towards citizens’ participation. One that has higher ethical value to voice 
citizens is expected to put more efforts in making participatory tools more available 
(Yang & Callaham, 2007; Demiris, 2006; Handely, Milam, & Howell-Moroney, 2010). 
 Citizens display different participatory behaviours, depending on their 
political culture. Some feel more attractiveness to an active citizenship (high political 
profile). Others, with a low-political profile, don’t have the same necessity to play such 
an active role in public governance. Communities where citizens have more high political 
profile are expected to have more participatory mechanisms. 
 Beside the citizens’ willingness to participate and the degree of 
accountability displayed by public official, the fact is that contextual factors can motivate 
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both sides towards more participation. The size of communities and mass media accuracy 
are, among other, factors that can help to understand the levels of citizen participation.  
 
Political responsiveness  
 Bryer (2006) explains responsiveness in public administration as a 
continuum based on three ethical perspectives: control-centered; discretionary; and 
deliberative. The first focuses on a formal responsiveness shaped by bureaucratic rules, 
norms and structures. The others are more suitable to an administration willing to 
promote citizen participation in decision-making process as a way to balance both 
organizational and transparency fragmentation. Responsiveness ethically based on a 
discretionary perspective is linked to the New Public Management reform and 
entrepreneur’s responsiveness. Flexibility and competitive trends hit public 
administration in a way that managers were allowed to engage a strategy of empowering 
customers in a specific organizational strategy of orientation towards identified 
stakeholders. Deliberative perspective focuses on collaborative responsiveness as the 
extent to which elected officials seek civic participation and feel motivated to share some 
degree of their public powers. This responsiveness is the result of an evolutionary process 
in public administration, starting from a point were citizens had a vague importance 
moving to a moment were they play an important role  as collaborative partner (Vioga, 
2002). 
 Civic engagement in governmental decision-making process depends on the 
level of responsiveness of political officials. If they feel more accountable to citizens, an 
effort will be made to schedule public hearing, to hold informal contact, to use 
participatory budget and to promote citizen inquiries (Handely, Milam, & Howell-
Moroney, 2010; Schedler, 1999).  
 Prior studies have shown that political responsiveness concept has been 
widely used in academic work to explain willingness of public administration to engage 
civic participation. Chi (1999) uses responsiveness to test citizens’ satisfaction towards 
government services. For Alford (2002), responsiveness is a way of public officials to 
build-up a relationship with their customers. This relationship is a selfish strategy for 
officials to gather information from citizens. Responsiveness toward external 
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stakeholders was used by Yang and Callaham (2007) to prove a positive relation with 
civic participation. Handely and Howell-Moroney (2010) found evidence that supports 
the fact that both responsiveness and the numbers of stakeholders clusters matters for 
citizens’ participation. Nevertheless, all these works use mostly administrative 
responsiveness and actual civic participation. Few are concerned with political 
accountability to citizens or with institutional changes that allow more participatory 
strategies. This is probably due to the fact that public managers play a key role in 
decision-making process and lack of democratic legitimacy. In this paper we use political 
responsiveness to fill this gap and also because in the Portuguese case, as we’ve already 
mentioned, local government is characterized by a strong presidential system.  
 
Political culture 
 Several studies have focused on the factors that lead to an active 
participatory attitude from citizens. Some focuses on the local government size, on the 
partisan competition, other on the population heterogeneity (ethnical, religious and 
qualifications) and social status. Nevertheless, most of this investigation looks at civic 
participation as a social phenomena to be explained. Again, this is not our objective. We 
like to keep in mind that we seek to understand the incumbents’ decisions to allow 
mechanisms of civic participation, and we argue that the political culture displayed by 
citizens can have an effect on the political decision to voice citizens.  
 Political culture has been traditionally defined as the way that citizens think 
of the government utility (Elazar, 1984) and as a way to define peoples’ perception of the 
administrative output and their own participation in the political process (Almond & 
Verba, 1972). Elazar (1984) identified three political cultures. The differences relay on 
the use acknowledged to government since it is purely a servant of private interests 
(individualistic), or it’s considered to serve the common good (moralistic); and it reaches 
a paternalistic pattern (traditionalistic). Almond and Verba (1972) typify the well known 
and mostly use classification of political culture: parochial, subject and participant. 
Participant political culture is defined as one where citizens have high level of political 
awareness and are conscience that they can organize themselves as groups to influence 
the decision-making process. 
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 The main argument is that communities with higher levels of political 
culture will be more aware of political issues and will display a higher political profile. In 
consequence, citizens will be more willing to take a peace of the action and will increase 
pressure on elected officials to be more accountable and to allow greater civic 
participation. 
 When we deal with political culture, one of the first ideas that pops up to our 
head is the electoral process and citizens’ active/passive participation. Evans (2004) 
provides us a full model of voting with determinants at macro, meso and mirco level. 
However this is not the objective of the paper, we rather focus on the relations between 
political culture and civic participation. By this participation we mean not only voting, 
but a larger understanding of the concept, one that emphasises the voluntary participation 
of citizens on the local government structures using the proper tools made available by 
the latest. 
 In prior academic work, we didn’t found such an empirical testing of the 
concept of political culture, but rather an epistemological use. We are interested in 
defining, measuring and test the concept of participative political culture. 
 
Contextual factors 
 Beside incumbents’ political responsiveness and citizens’ political culture, 
we found, on the literature, other relevant factors that explain participation. Contextual 
factors can drive politicians to be more accountable than they are willing to be. One 
factor seam to gather some consensus when explaining citizen’ participation: size. 
However, despite the fact that there is a lot of academic works focusing on size and on its 
explanatory power, the true is that they focus on alternative approaches to it. Some have 
focus on the size of the local government jurisdiction while other chooses to deal with its 
bureaucratic size. Oliver (2000) found evidence that population size matters and should 
be taken in consideration. Later, Carr (2010), Tavares and Carr (2010) found evidence 
that, more importance than population, density plays an important role in civic 
participation. Wang (2001) uses the number of full-time employees to find evidence that 
the larger the local government the greater the participation will be. His explanation is 
that people are afraid to lose touch with the inside bureaucracy. So, people will tend to 
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participate more in bigger bureaucratic local government. Again, these academic works 
deal directly with citizen’ decision to become civically active. This is not scope of this 
paper although we can use the same arguments since more willingness to participation 
will increase incumbents’ pressure to become more accountable and to voice citizens. 
 Media also play an important role in civic participation process. Some 
classic work, such as Anderson (1984) and Lindblom (1980), have already explained the 
key role of mass media in agenda setting and exploring windows of opportunities to build 
public opinion. For this specific investigation, mass media are an important player since, 
as argue by Wang (2001), it influences peoples’ attention to local government problems 
making them more aware. 
 As contextual factors, we argue that bureaucratic and community size as 
well as their level of concentration puts an additional pressure upon public officials to be 
more accountable towards citizens. We also argue that local and regional mass media can 
have an influence on setting up the political agenda making incumbents more vulnerable 
to public opinion.  
 
Instruments of participation  
 So far we’ve highlighted and argue that the multiplicity of entities 
responsible to deliver public services and the evident fragmentation of responsibilities 
motivated a necessary update in the institutional accountability system. Citizen 
participation in decision-making process appears to suite both managerial and political 
strategies. First, because it serves the purpose of a central attention to the citizen as a 
stakeholder and secondly, it helps to build a more active citizenship. However citizen’s 
participation, as we’ve already argued, can only happen if they are given the chance to do 
so. This is the main objective of this paper, that is, to analyse the factors that drive 
political official’s decisions to provide participatory mechanisms. 
 Literature had done a systematic effort to categorize different and alternative 
ways and instruments of participation. Leach and Wingfield (1999), classified 
instruments of citizen participation into three categories: 
1. Traditional – usually citizen participation is done through public meetings and 
public policy presentation; 
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2. Focus on costumer – survey of costumers satisfaction, monitorization of costumers 
needs, complaints’ book;  
3. Focus on citizens – interactive websites,  e-government, specialist meetings, 
referendums;  
For the purpose of this paper, we use an alternative classification. We divided 
instruments of participation between political and administrative ones. As political 
instrument we’ve classified those that are, somehow, connected with political decision-
making process of strategy choices for the local government: 
• Local referendum – democratic process where citizens are asked to vote in 
relevant issues. Usually a questions is asked and citizens mark whether they agree or 
not with the situation/bill; 
• Public hearing – Public meeting with the purpose to allow citizens to comment on 
a specific issue; 
• Committees – Creation of a group of expertise that will assist politicians in the 
decision making process. Local officials, choose to call citizens, based on their field 
of expertise, to give their opinion or to create a solution for a problem faced by the 
local government; 
• Informal meetings/contacts – Casual meetings between citizens and their elected 
official. This informal situations happens whether in situations where citizens 
address themselves to the politicians in an attempt to solve their problems or when 
citizens e-mail their constituents; 
• Participatory Budget – Budgetary process where a part of the overall budget is 
decided by citizens; 
 
 As administrative instruments we have those linked with participation regarding an on-
going administrative procedure: 
• Citizen Office – A specific department created specially to deal with citizens’ 
needs. It’s an office that concentrates the communication channels between local 
government and citizens; 
• E-government – Electronic tools that allow citizens to follow the development of 
their petition through the phases of the administrative process; 
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• Citizens Complains Book  - Administrative book were citizens can register their 
complains toward civil servant, political officials or the local government itself; 
 
Hypothesis  
 One contribute of this work is the fact that it focuses on the institutional 
tools made available by local government to citizens. A lot of prior works focus on civic 
participation itself, on the numbers of citizens attending public hearings or going to a 
public meeting. The main objective is to capture and analyse citizens’ behaviour vis-á-vis 
civic engagement strategies to allow the use of participatory mechanism. So, in our 
opinion, there is a lot of interest in analysing political behaviour which promote 
institutional changes that allow political and administrative forms of participation. We 
propose that the decision to promote voice to citizens is political and depends on the 
responsiveness of political officials, citizens’ culture and contextual factors. 
 Our first hypothesis is based on Yang and Callaham (2007) and Handely and 
Howell-Moroney (2010) investigation. Political responsiveness represents the image, 
based on ethical value of civic engagement, that politicians have from a shared decision-
making process. Political responsiveness represents also the incumbents’ feeling of a 
trustable relation with citizens founded on accountability and transparency. Hence, our 
hypothesis is:  
H1: The greater the political responsiveness is the more participatory instruments will be 
available to citizen. 
 The second sets of hypotheses are based on the political culture argument. 
Although the political cultural concept is, normally, linked to a citizen determinant of 
participation, For the purpose of this paper we gave it a different use. Keeping his 
capacity to explain civic engagement, we argue that the elected officials’ perception of 
this willingness to participate influence their decision to promote the needed institutional 
change to allow better and wider participation.  
 Earlier we stated that participative political culture would lead to bigger 
pressure on official elected to voice citizens. One major contribution of this work may be 
the empirical use of a participatory culture. As we already said, we couldn’t find as much 
empirical as we hoped. So, we tried to measure participative political culture using three 
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different indicators. The first deals with voting process. We argue that citizens that care 
to vote and have a strong motivation to participate on an electoral act have the same 
motivation to use other means of participation. On the politician side, the level of 
participation on political election may be a sign of how much their citizens are willing to 
take a stand. Although there are some exceptions, we believe that there is a good 
probability that citizens who don’t show interest in local government election aren’t 
interested in the everyday life and problems of the community. Hence, we hypotheses 
that:  
H2: Bigger availability of participatory tools is positively linked to high levels of 
electoral participation. 
We also argue that a participative political culture can be measured by the 
dispersion of vote through all the parties running for election. We believe that partisan 
competition will have a positive effect on civic participation. Political parties tend to 
focus on median voter preferences and to build up a sufficiently abstract agenda in order 
to maximize their votes and probabilities to win elections (Weimer & Vining, 1999). 
Doing that some branches of  the population are left aside. This is an attractive political 
market for others parties to establish their electoral bases. Reminding the traditional idea 
that politicians are agents with selfish-motivation and seek re-election (Niskanen, 1971; 
Nozick, 1974), partisan competition will increase pressure on elected officials. We 
believe that politician in office will, in this situation, use all strategies to gain citizens 
preferences allowing them to participate, than we propose: 
H3: Communities with a wide concentration of votes in the winner party will have less 
participatory instruments. 
 One of elements that Almond and Verba (1972) identify to define 
participatory culture is the capacity of citizens to organize themselves in voluntary 
networks. Belonging to civic organization, citizens display a high capacity to work close 
to their community needs and to build up an entrepreneur spirit close to public 
administration ethics of the common good. We argue that people that have nonmonetary 
and altruist motivations to create non-governmental organizations will increase pressure 
on local government in order to allow more participation. So, our hypothesis is that: 
IRSPM, Dublin – Ireland, 11-13 April 2011 
 
 14 
H4: Communities with more non-profit organizations will have more participatory 
instruments. 
 Finally, we believe that qualifications influence civic participation. People 
with more qualifications have more awareness of public affairs and have technical 
knowledge that allows a better participation. Yang and Callaham (2007) work found 
evidence that participation was held on due to the perception of government that some 
issue under debate were so complex to the majority of the citizens. 
H5: Communities with a higher level of qualification will have more participatory 
instruments. 
At least, we consider contextual factors as those leading to willingness voice 
citizens. Our first argument is that size is an important factor when it comes to civic 
participation. In some communities, the relative small size of local governments allows 
population to keep control “on sight”. That is, citizens don’t fell the need of a proper set 
of participatory tools, since they know official bureaucrats and that they can keep track of 
their actions. The fact is that organizations grow and become more complex usually the 
staff follows this path making impossible to citizens to check directly each procedure. So, 
we argue that when citizens begin to loose track of their bureaucracy, they will put an 
extra pressure to have more participatory mechanisms. Hence our hypothesis: 
H6: The greater the administrative staff of the local government the more participatory 
instruments will be available to citizens. 
 On the other hand, bigger communities can make citizens alienated from 
collective problems and less willing to have a political high profile. This is not an 
opposite hypothesis from the earlier since we target to measure a different effect. In the 
last one we sought to control the administrative size of the local government, that doesn’t 
necessarily mean that we have a larger city, that’s why we need to get a proper indicator 
to gauge administrative size. In this case the argument is that living in bigger 
communities people are less familiar with their neighbours and less interested in local 
affairs.  So we hypothesis that: 
H7: Communities with bigger population are likely to have less participatory instruments. 
 Recent work by Carr (2010) and Tavares and Carr (2010) stated that more 
than the size of the population, it is its concentration that can explain more civic 
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participation. The main idea is that population concentration creates denser social 
networks that stimulate participation in a way that undermine the hinder effect of city 
size. Hence we hypothesis that: 
H8: Communities with higher population density are likely to have more participatory 
instruments. 
 In our last hypothesis we argue that the existence of larger media will induce 
higher levels of awareness of local affairs. As we know, media plays a decisive role 
building up political agenda and seize windows of opportunities.  We argue that more 
local newspapers and radios will promote local network. So, our hypotheses are: 
H9: Communities more politically aware have more participatory instruments. 
H9.1: Communities with more local newspapers are more political aware; 
H9.2: Communities with more local radios are more political aware; 
The hypotheses introduced need to be fulfil with indicators in order to be 
empirically tested. In the next section we will turn to data and methods employed in this 
analysis.  
 
Data and Method 
Presenting our hypotheses, we propose several determinants that drive elected 
officials’ decisions to ensure political and administrative tools of participation. The study 
analyses the allocation of participatory tools in Portugal. We conducted an electronic 
survey addressed to the all 278 elected officials of continental Portuguese municipalities. 
We received 84 responses, but we only consider 73 as valid, due incomplete inquiries, 
corresponding to a 26.3% response rate.  
Our dependent variable is a scale of participatory tools made available to citizens 
by incumbents. So, our proxy for the willingness to voice citizens is the number of 
different tools, administrative and political, that elected officials make available to their 
community. For each administrative and political tool of participation, we’ve created a 
dummy variable. The respondents received a summed score of their responses. High 
scores represented higher levels of administrative or political tools of participation, and 
lower scores represented the opposite. We also build an overall scale summing up both 
administrative and political scores. 
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 The model specification includes several indicators for the three suggested 
explanatory factors: political responsiveness; political culture and; contextual factors.   
Following procedures by Handely and Howell-Moroney (2010), we assess the 
level of political responsiveness using a four-point Likert-type scale ranging from 
“strongly agree” (1) to “strongly disagree” (4). Respondents were asked to rank several 
statements according to their level of agreement. Then we establish an index of political 
responsiveness based on the sum of the answers. We expect a positive effect between the 
score recorded on political responsiveness and participation. 
Political culture is assessed by a set of four different variables: electoral 
participation; votes’ concentration; non-profit organizations and; level of qualification. 
Electoral participation is a well-known concept that measures the degree in which people 
with the ability to vote opt to participate in the electoral act. For the purpose of this 
investigation we use 2008 local government election data from the national commission 
of election, to capture the level of electoral participation. We expect a positive relation 
between electoral participation and civic participation. The concentration of the votes is 
calculated through the proportion of votes of the wings party/coalition. We expect that 
bigger concentration of votes in the winner will induce a lower willingness to voice 
citizens. Again data was collected from the national commission of election to capture the 
level of electoral abstention. The size of nonprofit sector in each community was already 
used in previous investigation (Tavares & Rodrigues, 2011), and it’s measured by the 
number of nonprofit firms in each jurisdiction registered in 2010 with the Social Security 
Financial Management Office of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. We measure 
the qualification of a community by its potential and accurate critical mass. We do this by 
measuring the proportion of population that have an undergraduate (or more) degree and 
by the number of people living in the local government jurisdiction. We expect to find a 
positive relation between this factors and the willingness of local government to promote 
civic participation. All these variables are collected from the National Bureau of Statistics 
(INE, 2009).  
Finally, contextual factors are gauge by the local government size and the level of 
public awareness. The size of the local government was assessed in three different ways 
to fit the purposed hypothesis. Administrative size of each jurisdiction was measure using 
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the ratio between the numbers of local government employees for 1,000 habitants; data 
was collected from the National Bureau of Statistics (INE, 2009). The same source was 
use to determine the population of each municipality. In these cases we expect to find 
opposite behaviors. While the bureaucratic size is getting bigger we expect more 
participation, and, as we defined in our hypothesis, bigger population will drag down a 
more active citizenship due to the social alienation process.  The indicators to gauge levels 
of awareness from citizens towards local affairs were extracted from the survey. 
Respondents were asked to indicate the number of radios and local newspapers of the 
jurisdiction. Then, we build-up an index based on the sum of the answers. In this case we 
expect a positive relation to participation. 
We use the number of parishes and the ideology as control variables. The number 
of parishes is a count variable based on the number of parishes that belong to a 
municipality. We expect to measure the effect of the administrative fragmentation in a 
local government, on the willingness to voice citizens. We also found relevant to measure 
the ideology of political officials and, as so, we use a dummy variable to test a relation 
between left/right wing municipalities and the number of participatory tools. Left wing 
was coded with “0” and right wing with “1”. All Variables and indicators are summarized 
in table 1 with their descriptive statistics.  
[Table 1 here] 
Our dependent variable, the number of tools of participation in each jurisdiction, 
is a count variable which requires the use of poisson regression. This is the appropriate 
estimation technique to treat event counts, when we can assume the assumption that the 
conditional mean of the distribution equals the conditional variance (equidispersion). We 
tested our models for overdispersion and the goodness-of-fit χ2 test allows us not to reject 
the null hypothesis that the data is Poisson distributed. The poisson regression results are 
presented in Table 2. Coefficients are reported as incidence-rate ratios that represent an 
advantage in interpretation over standard poisson coefficients, since they do not depend 
on the level of the variable of interest or all other variables included in the model. A unit 
change in a given independent variable Xk changes the output count by a factor of 
exp(βk). 
 
IRSPM, Dublin – Ireland, 11-13 April 2011 
 
 18 
Empirical Findings 
[Table 2 here] 
 The overall results confirm a strong relation between the level of political 
responsiveness and the willingness to voice citizens. High scores on the way that elected 
officials think about civic participation increases the participatory tools available to 
citizens. Contextual factors show strong explanation to the objective of this paper. 
Administrative size and local newspaper receive strong support, though in the first results 
aren’t consistent with the hypotheses suggested. However, we didn’t find such strong 
evidence when analyzing political culture. In this case, results show a lack of consistency 
and, sometimes, reject the purposed hypotheses.  
The first set of results, using the scale of political participatory tools made 
available to citizens by incumbents as a dependent variable, found support from all 
arguments earlier presented. As already said, political responsiveness determines the use 
of more political tools of participation; again we’ve found strong evidence of it. Political 
culture argument is supported by the results of the qualification level. Jurisdictions with a 
more educated population put pressure on elected officials to make municipalities more 
open to citizen participation. Size argument received some support. In fact, jurisdictions 
with bigger population discourage citizens to have higher political commitment. As so, 
there isn’t such pressure to consider its participation since people haven’t strong social 
links with each other. The number of local newspaper has similar effect. Keeping people 
more informed about public problems will increase their awareness of political decision 
and, therefore, their pressure on incumbents to be heard in decision-making process. 
Nevertheless, some findings have a different behavior that what was expected. Electoral 
participation doesn’t support our hypotheses and reveal that higher participation in 
election decrease the willingness of elected officials to make available more participatory 
tools. This fact can be explained as an effort made by the municipalities that have less 
electoral participation, in promoting mechanisms of participation and, doing so, they fight 
back abstention. Another drawback is the negative association found with higher number 
of local radios. The other happens when measuring size through administrative staff. 
Instead of controlling it increases bureaucracy claiming more participatory tools, and 
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citizen, in jurisdiction with more staff, feel more alienated and loose the mood to claim 
participation tools. 
  Results show evidence that the numbers of parishes have a positive relation with 
the decision to voice citizens. As noted on other academics works (Tavares & Carr, 2010; 
Tavares & Rodrigues, 2011) internal fragmentation makes people more demanding of 
participation. 
 The second set of results, using the scale of administrative participatory tools 
made available to citizens by incumbents as a dependent variable, received less overall 
support. Evidence allows us again to argue that the political responsiveness has an 
important role in making more participatory mechanisms available.  
On the other hand, results, in this case, don’t support our argument of size and 
lack of statistical significance in our political culture and political awareness argument. 
Using administrative staff and population to measure size, results indicate a negative 
relation, which invalidate our hypothesis.  
 Ideology, however, indicates that left wing municipalities are more willing 
to provide citizens with administrative tools of participation. 
 
Conclusion  
 A lot of academic work has been made to analyse civic participation. Some 
of them deal with electoral participation, other with wider forms of participation. We 
argue that participation is only possible when elected officials create the appropriate 
tools, both political and administrative, to voice citizens.  
   Yang and Callaham (2007) and Handely and Howell-Moroney (2010) 
argue that political responsiveness of local managers can provide an explanation to the 
use of participatory mechanisms. The authors argue that there is a positive relation. The 
more managers see themselves accountable to citizens the more they are willing to voice 
them. Due to the Portuguese local government presidential system, we chose to direct our 
analysis to the president of the local government instead of the manager. 
 In addition to the political responsiveness, that has its foundation on the 
moral structures of the decision maker, we choose complement it by bringing in external 
pressures that can act on elected officials’ decision to voice citizens. These external 
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factors are the political culture of citizens, their awareness of political process and the 
size of the local government. 
 We found evidence that some external pressures are positively related to 
more participatory mechanisms: level of population’s education; mass media coverage. 
However political responsiveness is the argument that received the strongest support to 
explain the motivations of elected officials to create more participatory mechanisms. 
 So, we can argue that, although external factors have some influence in 
elected official decision to provide tools of participation, the final call depends on 
subjective factors based on ethical values of each political agent. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent         
Political Participation Scale 3.260274     1.343993  1           6 
Administrative Participation Scale 2.219178      1.216171           0           4 
Overall Participation Scale 5.479452     2.095694      1 10 
Independent     
Political Responsiveness 10.57534     4.521301      0          19 
Electoral Participation 63.25777     7.772204       46.88     78.67 
Votes Concentration 52.91133     8.446488       34.09    76.56 
Nonprofit Organizations  (log) 2.428252    .9735617          .69     4.60 
Level of qualification 83.4001 45.42788 0     223.46 
Administrative Staff (per 1000) 16.15056     10.47413 0     48.24 
Population (log) 9.861151 1.14964  7.8     12.19 
Population Density    345.0807     1092.172   6.6   7597.17 
Local Newspaper 1.794521    1.64957   0           17 
Local Radio .7260274   .6924248   0          2 
Parishes 14.87671     14.17053  2 68 
Ideology .4383562  .4996193 0          1 
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Table 2. Poisson Regression Analysis  
 
 Political  
Participation 
Administrative 
Participation 
Overall  
Participation 
Independent variables IRR (RSE) 
IRR 
(RSE) 
IRR 
(RSE) 
Political Responsiveness 1.035079***    (.0138312) 
1.037641*  
(.0227166) 
1.035823**    
(.0148115) 
Electoral Participation .9764724**    (.0092194) 
.9971485    
(.0117016) 
.9850555*    
(.0085521) 
Votes Concentration 1.004182    (.0048799) 
1.00412    
(.0059982) 
1.004178    
(.0039632) 
Nonprofit Organizations  
(log) 
.9223985    
(.0800669) 
.8310374   
 (.1080959) 
.8869326    
(.0754502) 
Level of qualification 1.002432***    (.0008464) 
.9991355    
(.0013735) 
1.001086    
(.0008112) 
Administrative Staff (per 
1000) 
.9837827***    
(.0053207) 
.9855827*    
(.0084088) 
.9846588***    
(.0049236) 
Population (log) .7940684**    (.0748063) 
.9940365    
(.1424893)  
.8705737    
(.0779957) 
Population Density .9999925    (.0000304) 
.9999125*    
(.0000508) 
.9999657    
(.0000233) 
Local Newspaper 1.087783**    (.0392322) 
1.053811    
(.0503107) 
1.07196 **   
(.0322783) 
Local Radio .796091**    (.0760904) 
1.100865   
 (.1247447) 
.913892    
(.0701085) 
Parishes 1.008489**    (.0040386) 
1.004844    
(.0057936) 
1.006977*   
(.0041002) 
Ideology 1.07502    (.0908156) 
.8056773*   
(.0949719) 
.9508305    
(.0757457) 
Observations 
Wald chi2 
Prob>chi2 
Pseudo R2 
73 
64.40 
.0000 
.0579 
73 
23.60 
.0231 
.0511 
73 
29.32 
.0035 
.0639 
Goodness-of-fit 
Prob>chi2 
28.74185 
.9998 
49.40398 
.8337 
44.55328 
.9320 
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
